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I. INTRODUCTION
A wretched man, for love of a woman and of "the child
she had borne him, "finding himself bereft of all resources,
had counterfeited money. "[Clounterfeiting was still
punished [by] death" in those days. "The woman was
arrested for" spending the very first counterfeit bill the man
had printed. She was held, but there was no evidence
against anyone else but her. She alone could identify her
lover, the source of the counterfeit funds. She refused. The
police pressed her. She continued to refuse. Finally the
chief investigator had an idea: he insinuated that the
woman's lover had become unfaithful to her; he even
arranged to present her with scraps of letters to persuade
her that there was another woman that her lover was
cheating on her. Driven to desperation "by jealousy, she
denounced her lover" and confessed everything. The man
was doomed. The two would be tried and condemned
together.
By playing the jealousy card, the chief investigator had
traded truth for anger, justice for vengeance. All this was
related to the bishop. He listened in silence. Then he asked,
Where will the man and the woman be judged?
At the court of assizes, he was told.
"And where," he asked, "will the chief investigator be
judged?"1
* B.A., University of California, 1974; J.D., Georgetown University, 1982. The author
gratefully acknowledges the contributions made in the preparation of this article by Erica
Rutner.
1. VICTOR HuGo, LEs MISERABLES (Charles E. Wilbour trans., Everyman's Library 2d
ed. 1997) (1909).
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Earl Wyche was in custody in small-town Florida on a charge of
probation violation.2 Unbeknown to him, he was also a suspect in a rape
case.3 The police, eager to obtain a Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample
from Wyche for the rape investigation-something they could have done
easily without any subterfuge 4-hit upon an ingenious, if shameful,
stratagem.
They lied to him.5
What they told him was that a local supermarket had been burgled and
that he could exonerate himself by providing a DNA sample.6 Wyche did
not know that the whole thing was a fairy tale: There was no supermarket
and there was no burglary.7 What he did know was that he hadn't burgled
any supermarkets lately, so if that was the reason the police wanted his DNA,
well, why shouldn't he provide it?8
They lied to him in another way, too.9
The police lied to Wyche by what they didn't tell him. ° They didn't
tell him about the rape case they were investigating, and they didn't tell him
that his DNA profile, once obtained, would be made available to other
government agencies conducting other investigations at other times andplaces,."
In the event, the DNA test exonerated Wyche of the rape of which he
had been suspected.' But it implicated him in an unrelated burglary. 3 Prior
2. Wyche v. State (Wyche 1), 906 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
3. See id.
4. Id. at 1144. The police could have gotten a tissue sample from which Wyche's DNA
could have been profiled in any number of ways. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming
"Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. RaV. 857,
860-61 (2006). Recall that Wyche was in custody. Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1143. Did he eat
with a fork, spoon, or "spork" provided by the jail? See Joh, supra note 4, at 860-61. Did he
drink from a glass or cup? See id at 861. Did he throw away the butt of a cigarette, or the
crust of an unfinished sandwich? See id. at 860-61. Any of these things would contain cell
tissue from which DNA might be recovered, and Wyche would have no assertable legal
interest in any of them. See id.; see also discussion infra notes 184, 185, and 190 (regarding
FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2007)).
5. Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1143.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Wyche v. State (Wyche 11), 987 So. 2d 23, 62 (Fla. 2008) (Lewis, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 27 (majority opinion).
10. See id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 27. As discussed infra note 198, Wyche's DNA profile is now permanently on
display to every CODIS licensee, and may be examined and re-analyzed at any time without
notice to Wyche.
12. Wyche I, 906 So. 2d at 1143.
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to trial on that burglary he moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing
that the consent pursuant to which his cell tissue was seized and analyzed
was, as a result of the deception worked upon him by the police, no consent
at all.' 4 The motion to suppress was denied, and the ensuing conviction was
affirmed on appeal to Florida's First District Court of Appeal.
5
The Supreme Court of Florida has no general criminal appellate
jurisdiction. 6  It is empowered, however, to review the decision of an
intermediate appellate court upon a certification of conflict by that court with
a decision of another intermediate appellate court.17 The First District Court
of Appeal, in affirming Wyche's conviction, in the process approving the
denial of his motion to suppress, 8 certified conflict with the opinion of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. McCord;9 thus providing the
jurisdictional basis for the Supreme Court of Florida's review. 20
In a four to three ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that
Wyche's consent was constitutionally valid, the conduct of the police
notwithstanding. 2' The Court excerpted with approval the following
language from the opinion of the First District:
"[Wyche] was clearly aware of the fact that the officer wanted the
DNA sample in order to investigate a crime, and the officer did not
misrepresent the fact that he had no search warrant. The officer
did not indicate that [Wyche] had no choice regarding whether to
provide a DNA sample. [Wyche] did not acquiesce to a claim of
lawful authority."
22
In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that "Wyche was not a
stranger to police procedure .... he knew that his DNA was requested for use
in a criminal investigation, [and he] was not deluded as to the import of his
consent to search. ' 23 Viewing these circumstances as relevant, and taking




15. Id. at 1143, 1148.
16. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(1).
17. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).
18. Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1143, 1148.
19. 833 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1144.
20. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).
21. Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d 23, 29 (Fla. 2008).
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Justice Bell concurred dubitante for himself and Chief Justice Quince.25
Justice Bell confessed himself "disturbed by the level of intentional police
misrepresentation" visited upon Wyche, and by the prospect that similar
police "tactics, if they were to become commonplace, would destroy the
integrity of the criminal justice system."26 Triumphing over these concerns,
however, Justice Bell and Chief Justice Quince voted with the majority.27
It is the thesis of this case note that Wyche II is wrong twice over. The
law setting forth when and in what circumstances the police may use deceit
to obtain consent to search or seize is well-settled. The majority in Wyche II
ignored that well-settled law, in the process ignoring decisions from a host of
jurisdictions, state and federal, that speak with one voice as to that law.2
This is more troubling because Florida's Constitution has a dependent, not an
independent, guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. 29 Although
article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution promises that the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures... shall not be violated," section 12 was
amended in 1982 to add language providing that it was to:
be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
30
In effect, the Florida Constitution instructs the reader, "Where the law
of search and seizure is concerned, go consult general American law; I have
nothing to add to that., 31 Yet the court's opinion in Wyche II ignores the
ample body of American jurisprudence on point-jurisprudence that compels
a result at odds with the one reached by the Wyche II majority.32
Consideration of this jurisprudence, and the outcome it compels on the
Wyche II facts, forms the first section of this case note.
25. Id. at 31-32 (Bell, J., specially concurring).
26. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 32.
27. Id. at 31 (majority opinion).
28. See id. at 42-43 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
29. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 63-64 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 33
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It is apodictic that a search or seizure that exceeds the scope of consent
is-unless supported by a warrant-unconstitutional, and the fruits of such a
search or seizure inadmissible.33 The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in
Wyche II gives no more than passing consideration to the problems of scope
of consent presented by the Wyche II facts.34 In a more conventional context,
this might be a merely venial sin; no profound legal issues are in play when a
court considers-or fails to consider-whether, for example, consent to
search the trunk of a car subsumes consent to search packages contained
within the trunk.35 But the context in which Earl Wyche gave consent was
anything but conventional. 36 He was asked to provide a minute amount of
his cell tissue, from which whole libraries of scientific information could and
would be derived.37 That scientific information, in turn, would be made
permanently available for use by the forensic community nation-wide and
even world-wide, now and for years to come, for examination in connection
with crimes past, present, and future.38 The Supreme Court of Florida
opinion in Wyche II gives no consideration whatever to the scope of consent
issues that arise when DNA analysis and data storage is involved.39 Those
issues are addressed in the second section of this case note.
I. OF DECEIT AND CONSENT
It is sometimes said that the police may lie to obtain consent to search,
and that the ensuing search will not be deemed unlawful by reason of the
lie.n° In some sense, this is true. Suppose, for example, that a man dressed in
ordinary street clothing rings my doorbell in the middle of the night, explains
that he is interested in purchasing drugs, and asks if I have any drugs to sell
him. If I let him into my house to sell him drugs, my consent to his entry
will not be invalidated after the fact when it turns out that he is an
undercover detective and I am arrested for possession or sale of narcotics.4'
33. See, e.g., United States v. Benezario, 339 F. Supp. 2d 361, 368-69 (D.P.R. 2004).
34. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 27-28.
35. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991).
36. See Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 27.
37. Id.
38. See Joh, supra note 4, at 875.
39. See generally Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008).
40. See, e.g., id. at 31; see also People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. App. 1996).
41. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). Once upon a time, in
that "antique world, [w]hen service sweat for duty, not for meed," WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As
You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 3, some courts condemned police deceit even in the undercover context.
See, e.g., United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. Mass. 1954) ("Reckis cannot be
held to have consented to a search before he had any knowledge that the persons he was
20081
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Now suppose that when I answer my doorbell I confront, not a scruffy
would-be drug buyer, but a uniformed police officer. Suppose further that
the officer informs me that he is trying to rescue my neighbor's cat which
has become stuck in a tree, and that he would like to look out my back
window to get a better view of the cat's plight. Suppose finally that these
representations by the officer are all false: There is no cat, there is no tree,
and the officer's true purpose is to gain entry to my house to see if I have
drugs. The consent I give the officer to enter my house, having been
obtained by deceit, is not a knowing and valid consent for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and any contraband or evidence seized by the officer
in my house will not be admissible at trial.42 The difference in the two
hypothetical's turns on a single, simple legal principle: All citizens have a
"duty to cooperate with the police. 43 It therefore must follow that if a police
officer comes to me bearing the accouterments of office-uniform, or badge,
or formal ID-I can and must rely upon the truth of his representations to
me; and if those representations prove to be willfully false, my ensuing
consent is a legal nullity.44 "[A]ccess gained by a government agent, known
to be such by the person with whom the agent is dealing, violates the
[F]ourth [A]mendment's bar against unreasonable searches and seizures if
such entry was acquired by affirmative or deliberate misrepresentation of the
nature of the government's investigation. 45 Conversely, if the officer comes
to me in an undercover disguise, identifying himself not as a member of the
constabulary, but as a drug buyer, I deal with him at my peril.46 I have no
duty to cooperate with him, and he has no corresponding duty to tell me the
dealing with were federal officers or that they were there for the purpose of making a
search."); see generally Commonwealth v. Wright, 190 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1963). See United
States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting in dictum that "[t]rickery, fraud, or
misrepresentation on the part of the police to gain entry naturally undermines the
voluntariness of any consent."). But the essence of undercover operations is deceit. See
Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209. For courts to hold that undercover officers may not misrepresent their
identities, purposes, etc., would be to hold that undercover operations are per se unreasonable
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 210-11. No opinion of recent vintage has gone so far.
See United States v. Montes-Reyes, 547 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Instead,
courts have drawn the obvious and meaningful distinction between deceit in the course of an
undercover operation and deceit under color of office. See, e.g., United States v. Briley, 726
F.2d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1984).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
43. David T. McTaggert, Reciprocity on the Streets: Reflections on the Fourth
Amendment and the Duty to Cooperate with the Police, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1233, 1244 (2001).
44. See id.
45. Little, 753 F.2d at 1438 (emphasis added).
46. See SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 33
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truth.47  If I consent to his entry into my home, I must take the
consequences.48 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals drew the distinction with
particularity:
When a government agent presents himself to a private individual,
and seeks that individual's cooperation based on his status as a
government agent, the individual should be able to rely on the
agent's representations. We think it clearly improper for a
government agent to gain access to records which would otherwise
be unavailable to him by invoking the private individual's trust in
his government, only to betray that trust.
49
A ruse entry when the suspect is informed that the person seeking
entry is a government agent but is misinformed as to the purpose
for which the agent seeks entry cannot be justified by consent.
Thus we have disapproved the entry of federal narcotics agents
accomplished with the assistance of local law enforcement officers
who knocked on the suspect's door and asked permission to
investigate a fictitious robbery.
50
This language from SEC v. ESM Government Securities, Inc.,5s was
excerpted with approval by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bosse.
Distinguishing an earlier Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Allen,53 the
Bosse court drew the undercover-versus-under-color-of-office distinction:
the earlier case "is best understood as involving concealment by [an officer]
of the fact that he was a government agent, a permissible deception, rather
than as involving misrepresentation by a known government agent of his
purpose for seeking entry."'
The recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Krause v.
Commonwealth55 involves facts not dissimilar to those of Wyche 11.56
Trooper Manar of the Kentucky State Police made an arrest for cocaine
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 316.
50. United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
51. 645 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
52. 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
53. 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980).
54. Bosse, 898 F.2d at 116.
55. 206 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006).
56. See Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d 23, 24 (Fla. 2008).
20081
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possession. The arrestee told Manar that he had obtained the drugs at
Krause's home.5s Manar then showed up at Krause's residence at four
o'clock in the morning with a tale as false as the one given to Wyche: he
told Krause "that a young girl had just reported being raped by [Krause's
roommate] in the residence. He asked if he could look around in order to
determine whether her description of the residence and its furnishings was
accurate."59 Manar's ensuing search turned up drugs and drug paraphernalia,
for the possession of which Krause was prosecuted and convicted.6'
The Krause court recognized the distinction between undercover and
under-color-of-office police work.6 "The use of undercover agents and
stratagems in police investigations has long been sanctioned, and we do not
question such a practice in this opinion.'"62 But clearly Trooper Manar had
not been acting in an undercover capacity.63 He had knocked on Krause's
door bearing the customary accouterments of office, and he had asked in his
capacity as a law-enforcement officer for Krause's cooperation. 64 Therein
lay the problem.65 "Trooper Manar exploited a citizen's civic desire to assist
police in their official duties for the express purpose of incriminating that
citizen. "66 Krause was entitled, in deciding whether to consent to Manar's
request to search, to rely upon the truth and bona fides of Manar's
representations to him. 6 7
[Iff the type of ruse utilized by Trooper Manar was sanctioned by
this Court, citizens would be discouraged from "aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals" since they
would have no way of knowing whether their assistance was being
called upon for the public good or for the purpose of incriminating
them.
68
57. Krause, 206 S.W.3d. at 923.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 924.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 926-27.
62. Krause, 206 S.W.3d at 927.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 924.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 927.
67. See Krause, 206 S.W.3d at 927.
68. Id. at 926 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973)). The
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An appellate court in Washington State reached identical conclusions in
State v. McCrorey.69 The McCrorey court began by acknowledging the
widespread acceptance of "the use of ruse entries in conjunction with
undercover police activity. 70 It then drew the critical distinction: "The case
at hand is distinguishable, however. It does not present the issue of
undercover police activity, but rather the failure to disclose the actual police
purpose."'"
It is improper for a government agent to gain entry by invoking the
occupant's trust, then subsequently betraying that trust. Members
of the public should be able to safely rely on the representations of
government agents acting in their official capacity. We conclude
that police acting in their official capacity may not actively
misrepresent their purpose to gain entry or exceed the scope of
consent given.72
Krause and McCrorey involved consent to search a residence. 73 Graves
v. Beto,74 like Wyche, involved consent to the seizure of bodily tissue.
75
Graves was arrested "on a charge of public drunkenness., 76  Shortly
afterward the police learned "that an elderly woman had been raped" and that
"[h]er description of her assailant [matched] Graves. 77  Blood had been
recovered from the scene of the rape,78 so the police chief asked Graves to
consent to giving a blood sample, assuring him "that the sample would be
used only to determine the alcoholic content of his blood" for purposes of the
public drunkenness charge.79 Graves was then charged with the rape, and
evidence that his blood type--derived from the blood he had "consented" to
69. 851 P.2d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), overruled by State v. V.L., No. 57036-6-1,
2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1824, at * 1, *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2006).
70. Id. at 1239.
71. Id. at 1240.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922, 923-24 (Ky. 2006); McCrorey, 851 P.2d
at 1236.
74. 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 524. Although this may make the Graves facts closer to the Wyche facts, it is a
distinction without a difference. Whether a law enforcement officer seeks consent to enter
and search a home, or consent to seize a tissue sample, the Fourth Amendment considerations
are, for purposes of the jurisprudence of consent, the same. Id. at 525.
76. Id. at 524.
77. Id.
78. Graves, 424 F.2d at 524.
79. Id. at 525.
20081
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give-matched that found at the rape scene was offered at trial.8° On habeas
review the federal court found Graves' "consent" to be constitutionally
invalid; to hold otherwise "would allow the state to secure by stratagem what
the [F]ourth [A]mendment requires a warrant to produce."'"
The defendants in State v. Petersen82 were suspected of having stolen
certain power tools from their former employer.83 One of the defendants,
Rogers, was approached by police officers, who told him that they wanted
his consent to search his car.' The reason they gave for wanting to search,
however, was not the true one, i.e., their desire to locate the stolen power
tools and inculpate Rogers and Petersen for the theft.85 Instead, the officers
told Rogers that they believed that the previous owner of the car, from whom
Rogers had only recently purchased it, had stashed something in the vehicle
of evidentiary value to another, unrelated, investigation.86 Rogers "consented
to the search only because he was told the officers were searching for an
object hidden in the car by a previous owner. Since his consent was obtained
by deceit, Rogers cannot be said to have waived his Fourth Amendment
rights voluntarily. 87
The Hay Transportation Assistance Program (HTAP) is a federally-
funded rebate program benefiting the agricultural industry.88 It is of little
day-to-day interest in South Florida, but it is of a great deal of interest in the
Western District of Wisconsin, venue of United States v. Hrdlicka.9 In
Hrdlicka, Special Agent Lenckus, a criminal investigator in the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture, was deputed to
determine whether Joseph Hrdlicka, his two brothers, and their businesses-
collectively the "Hrdlicka defendants"-had conspired to defraud the
government in connection with HTAP claims.'
Agent Lenckus contacted Joseph Hrdlicka and informed him that he,
Lenckus, was conducting a criminal investigation, not into the conduct of the
80. Id. at 524.
81. Id. at 524-25.
82. 604 P.2d 267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).




87. Peterson, 604 P.2d at 269; see also Barnato v. State, 501 P.2d 643, 644 (Nev. 1972)
(Consent to an animal control officer's entry into an enclosed yard for the "ostensible purpose
of checking a cat trap.., did not constitute a waiver of' Fourth Amendment rights when the
real reason for the entry was to seize a leaf from a marijuana plant).
88. See generally In re Voorhees, 294 N.W.2d 646, 647 (S.D. 1980).
89. 520 F. Supp. 403, 403 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
90. Id. at 407. Lenckus came bearing the accouterments of office: He "showed Joseph
Hrdlicka his badge and identification card." Id.
[Vol. 33
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Hrdlicka defendants, but into the conduct of others; in that regard, he asked
to see the Hrdlicka defendants' books and records.9' Hrdlicka "asked
Lenckus if his investigation would involve [the] Hrdlicka businesses: ....
[t]o this question, Lenckus replied that no audit or investigation of Hrdlicka
businesses was contemplated and that the investigation did not pertain to the
Hrdlickas' farms, but only to other farmers to whom the Hrdlickas had sold
and delivered hay."92 Relying on Lenckus's representations, Joseph Hrdlicka
consented to produce various business records.93 But "Agent Lenckus's
statement to Joseph Hrdlicka ... that the Hrdlicka businesses and farms were
not under investigation was untrue ' 94 at the time it was made, and the
Hrdlicka defendants were indicted based upon information in the business
documents produced to Lenckus. 95
The district court took it as "well-established that the official use of
fraud, trickery or misrepresentation to gain consent to a search 'naturally
undermines the voluntariness of any consent,' ' ' 96 and "therefore renders such
a search 'unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 97  The
misrepresentations at issue here were described by the court as being both
active and passive.98 "By passive misrepresentations, I refer to Lenckus's
conceded failure to inform Hrdlicka that his farms were suspected of having
made false duplicate claims under HTAP .... 99 Telling half the truth and
leaving a false implication simply isn't good enough when a badge-carrying
law enforcement officer asks a citizen to waive the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.'0° Lenckus may well have been investigating, or at least
interested in information about, HTAP abuses by farmers other than the
Hrdlickas.'' But by failing to inform the Hrdlickas that he was also
interested in their putative misconduct, he rendered their ensuing consent a
nullity.' °2
The notion that a half-truth by the police is as damning as a complete lie
appears again in State v. Schweich.10 3 There the police wanted to search the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Hrdlicka, 520 F. Supp. at 407.
94. Id. at 408.
95. Id. at 407.
96. Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976)).
97. Id. (quoting United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977)).





103. See 414 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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defendant's home for two reasons: to find a gun belonging to an
acquaintance of the defendant, and to see if the defendant had narcotics. °4 In
seeking the defendant's consent, the police told him about the first purpose,
but not about the second. 05 This deception by omission-or by less than
complete candor-was sufficient to invalidate the defendant's consent."0 6
"[T]he officers intended the scope of their search to include drugs. However,
respondent was led to believe the search was necessary only to locate [his
friend]'s rifle... in connection with the assault charge against" his friend.'0 7
"The trial court properly suppressed" the narcotics for which the police were
looking, and which they found.0 8 The police statement to Schweich that
they wanted to search his apartment for his friend's gun or for evidence of
his friend's gun was true, as far as it went; but it didn't go far enough. 10 9 The
police were obliged to tell Schweich that another purpose of their search was
their desire to determine if he was in possession of narcotic drugs."0 Having
withheld this information, the police obtained Schweich's purported consent
on false pretenses, and that consent was a nullity for Fourth Amendment
purposes."'
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Slaton12 was the proprietor of a
pharmacy." 3 Narcotics detectives presented themselves at the pharmacy,
indicated that they were investigating the conduct of one Merriweather in
connection with forged prescriptions-which was, at the time, their true
purpose-and asked to see Slaton's pharmacy records."' The detectives
returned on a second occasion, purportedly for follow-up review of the
records." 5 In the interim, however, their investigation had expanded to
embrace their suspicions that Slaton himself was involved in the forgeries." 6
This change in focus of the investigation was not communicated to Slaton,
who continued to cooperate with what he had been led to believe was an
104. Id. at 228-29.
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id. at 230.
107. Id.
108. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d at 231.
109. See id. at 230.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 231.
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investigation of someone else." 7 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
explained:
[U]ntil the first search was completed, the agents' investigation
was focused upon Merriweather, as the agents truthfully disclosed.
As a result of this search, however, the focus of the agents'
investigation changed, and the agents returned to Slaton's
pharmacy with the belief that Slaton's conduct was improper.
Notwithstanding this new focus, the agents obtained entry to the
premises without any additional disclosure of purpose. One can
only conclude that in consenting to the search, Slaton relied on the
agents' earlier representations. By permitting him to continue this
reliance, the agents obtained [Slaton's] consent through deception.
Such acts amount to implied coercion. [Slaton's] consent,
therefore, was constitutionally invalid, and the search was
illegal. 118
As the foregoing sampling of case law indicates," 9 it is the universal
American rule that if a police officer comes to a citizen as a police officer,
bearing the insignia of a police officer, entitled to the cooperation due to a
police officer, there is a correlative duty on the part of that police officer to
tell that citizen the truth. 20  Breach of that duty renders any ensuing
117. Slaton, 608 A.2d at 6.
118. Id. at 10.
119. See Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[C]onsent to a warrantless
search obtained through coercion, duress or trickery, is not sufficient to overcome
constitutional infirmities"); United States v. Varona-Algos, 819 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Maudlin, No. 83-1743, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 13534, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 3,
1984) (citing United States v. Turpin, 707 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1983)); McCall v. People,
623 P.2d 397, 403 (Colo. 1981) (en banc). The same principle is applied in federal tax cases
in which a revenue agent obtains documents or admissions via consent while at the same time
failing to disclose to the taxpayer that the agent's investigation may result in criminal charges.
See, e.g., United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States
v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 (9th
Cir. 1985).
120. See infra pp. 2-13. There is no more reckless act on the part of the writer of a law
review article than to characterize a rule of law as "universal." Of course there is the
occasional aporetic voice. In United States v. Montes-Reyes, police obtained entry into
Defendant's hotel room by telling him that they were urgently engaged in the search for a
missing little girl; once in the room, the officers searched for and found illegal weapons,
which had been the object of their investigation all along. 547 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283-84
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The court canvassed the case law and granted suppression, but was
unwilling to characterize as a "per se rule" the doctrine that an officer acting under color of
law may not obtain consent by deceit. See id. at 287 n.7. To the same effect, see United
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"consent" involuntary. But the Supreme Court of Florida's majority opinion
in Wyche II makes no reference whatsoever to any of the cases discussed
supra; not a single citation to, or acknowledgment of, Little, Bosse, Krause,
McCrorey, Petersen, Hrdlicka, Schweich, Slaton, et. al.12' These authorities
are not distinguished. They are not discussed. It is as if they never
existed. 22
Writing for the majority in Wyche II, Justice Wells framed the issue as,
"whether the fact that Wyche consented to the saliva swabs upon being told
that the DNA sample was for use in a fictitious burglary investigation
requires that the saliva swabs containing Wyche's DNA not be used in the
prosecution of an actual burglary."'' 23 In Justice Wells's view, the question
was largely foreclosed by the prior opinion of the Court in Washington v.
State,24 in which the Court held that if the police obtained a tissue sample
from an arrestee, not by deceit, but by telling him frankly and candidly what
use they intended to make of that tissue sample, they could subsequently
make additional use of that tissue sample in another, unrelated, case. 125 As
Justice Wells and the majority saw it, Washington stands for the proposition
that:
[W]hen a defendant validly consents to the giving of the bodily
substance, whether saliva, hair, or blood, for use in a criminal
States v. Benezario, 339 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.P.R. 2004); People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939,
942 (Colo. App. 1996).
121. See generally Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008). Slaton appears without discussion
in a string citation in the dissenting opinion of Justice Anstead, which opinion also gives some
consideration to Krause. See id. at 38-39 (Anstead, J., dissenting). See also discussion infra
note 162 and 164. Hrdlicka, Bosse, and Slaton rated a single passing reference each in the
dissenting opinion filed by Justice Lewis. Id. at 48, 52 (Lewis, J., dissenting). The Florida
precedent that comes closest to addressing this issue is Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d 871, 875
(Fla. 1950), "in which we held that consent had not been established where the officers
pretended to be acting under a warrant which authorized the search .... There was thus an
element of misrepresentation in the case whereby the defendant's consent was in effect
fraudulently induced." Slater v. State, 90 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1956). But neither Dunnavant
nor Slater is cited in Wyche II. See generally Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008).
122. Wyche's brief before the Supreme Court of Florida cited none of these cases either.
See generally Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 23. Apart from the opinion of the First District Court of
Appeal as to which review was sought, and the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in State v. McCord, 833 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), as to which conflict
was claimed, Wyche's brief cited exactly ten cases. Brief of Petitioner at ii, Wyche v. State
(Wyche II), No. SC05-1509 (Fla. Oct. 2005). Three were from the United States Supreme
Court; the other seven were from Florida. Id.
123. Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 27.
124. 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 364; Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 27.
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investigation, the characteristics of the substance can be used in
investigations unrelated to the one for which the defendant was
told the sample was collected. This holding is logical because the
DNA profile derived from a bodily substance like saliva, hair, or
blood is a constant identifying fact that does not change or
disappear.
126
The first sentence of the excerpted paragraph flies in the face of all
American jurisprudence dealing with the scope of consent. Consent to
search or seize is a waiver of the constitutional right to be free from
warrantless search or seizure. 27 The citizen is not obliged to consent; if he
chooses to consent, he can tailor the terms of the consent as he chooses.1
28
Silly as it sounds, a householder could, as a matter of constitutional law, tell
a police officer: "You have my consent to search my house without a
warrant for as long as your partner can stand on one foot and yodel"' 29
Anything found within the time that the searching officer's partner remained
standing on one leg yodeling would be admissible; anything found after that
time would be inadmissible. 30 If a police officer asks an arrestee to provide
a tissue sample for blood- or DNA-typing as to case X, then the scope of the
consent is as to case X and as to no other case.' 3' The officer, of course, is
free to ask for a tissue sample for testing without limiting the use or purpose
to which the sample will be put. 32 If the arrestee consents on those terms, he
is stuck with them; but only if he is asked for, and consents to, something so
capacious.' Justice Wells' extrapolation from Washington that a consent to
provide cell tissue for testing in case X is a consent to the use of that cell
tissue in all cases, anywhere and anytime, stands the doctrine of scope of
consent on its head. 
134
126. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 27.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
128. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (noting that "[a] suspect may of
course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents").
129. See, e.g., United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129-30 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971)
(noting that "if government agents obtain consent or a warrant to search for a stolen television
set, they must limit their activity to that which is necessary to search for such an item")
(emphasis added).
130. See id. at 129 (quoting that "[a] consent search is reasonable only if kept within the
bounds of the actual consent") (citing Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916, 919 (8th Cir.
1953)).
131. Wyche I, 987 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 2008).
132. See id. at 29.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 27-28.
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Nor is this radical reinterpretation of the law of scope of consent
salvaged by the second sentence of the excerpted paragraph-that because a
DNA profile "is a constant identifying fact that does not change or
disappear," it must follow that a defendant's consent to the profiling of his
DNA in one case morphs magically into a consent to the profiling of his
DNA in all cases. 135 The scope of any consent is fixed by the intent of the
human being consenting, not by the nature-permanent or protean--of the
object as to which consent is given.'36 The notion of scope of consent is
entirely straightforward: The officer must ask for what he wants, and
confine himself to what he gets. 137 If he wants a consent broad in scope, but
is given a consent narrow in scope, he must confine himself to what he got
and not help himself to what he wanted, on pain of suppression. 38 If he
wants consent to use a defendant's cell tissue for testing on an ongoing basis,
without limitation, but he asks for and gets consent to use a defendant's cell
tissue for testing on a single occasion, he must confine himself to that single
occasion. 13 ' His failure to do so is what is known in the law, and to every
child, as "lying."'' 40 And this is true whether the object he seeks to seize or
search is as evanescent as the dew or as "constant as the northern star, [o]f
whose true-fix'd and resting quality [t]here is no fellow in the firmament.' ' 41
Proceeding on his "consent-for-one-purpose-is-consent-for-all-
purposes" premise, Justice Wells quite rightly observed that the only
remaining issue "is whether Wyche's otherwise apparently voluntary consent
was rendered involuntary by the fact that the Winn-Dixie burglary and
investigation were fictitious,"'42 or in plain language whether it is permissible
for the police, relying upon the duty of all of us to cooperate with them, to lie
to all of us. 43 He begins by referencing a case having nothing to do with
Fourth Amendment consent,'" Frazier v. Cupp.145 Its inapplicability to the
135. See id. at 27.
136. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
137. See id. 'The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object." Id.
(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982)).
138. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252.
139. See id. at 251 (holding "[tihe scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed
object").
140. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 140 (8th ed. 2004).
141. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 1.
142. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23, 28 (Fla. 2008).
143. See generally id.
144. Id. at 28.
145. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Frazier is a confession case, not a consent case. See id. at 737.
The Wyche II majority cites repeatedly to confession cases. Id. at 28. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v.
State, 900 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam); Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003)
(per curium); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2003) (per curium); Nelson v. State, 850 So.
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consent-obtained-by-deceit context was explained four decades ago by Judge
Wisdom in his opinion in Graves v. Beto. 46
Frazier involved the admissibility of a confession under pre-Miranda
standards. When the defendant Frazier refused to confess, the
interrogating officer told him falsely that his cousin and companion Rawls
had already confessed his part.... Frazier ultimately confessed ....
[Tjhe confession, which was otherwise voluntary, was not fatally
tainted by the interrogator's misrepresentations. But in this case
we do not void the consent as to the purpose for which it was
given. In the presence of misrepresentation in its acquisition, we
simply limit the state to the purposes represented. If Frazier were
applicable, and if we were considering the quality of the consent,
we would note that Frazier dealt with the voluntariness of a
confession rather than the waiver of a right not to be searched and
that in Frazier there was a partial warning of constitutional rights
whereas Graves received no warnings.
147
Apart from its reliance on confession jurisprudence, the Wyche II Court
notes time and again that there was no duress or coercion, no threats or
promises, that induced Wyche to consent to the seizure of his DNA. 48
[The police] informed Wyche that he was suspected of committing
a burglary, albeit a fictitious burglary, and requested a saliva
sample. He did not threaten Wyche or make any promises of
leniency in exchange for Wyche's consent. Accordingly, no threat
or promise influences our evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances of Wyche's consent.
149
Entirely true-and entirely beside the point.
It is apodictic that consent, to be valid, must be voluntary and
knowing. 50 "Consent" obtained at the business end of a Louisville slugger is
not voluntary.' 5' "Consent" obtained by mendacious and deceitful
2d 514 (Fla. 2003)(per curium); Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997)(per curium);
Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977) (per curium). All of these cases deal with the law
of confession; none deal with the law of consent. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 28. The Wyche
II court recognizes as much. See id.
146. 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970).
147. Id. at 525 n.2.
148. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 30-31.
149. Id. at 31.
150. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973).
151. See, e.g., Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 31.
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exploitation is not knowing. 152 To Wyche's claim that his purported consent
was anything but knowing-to his claim that he was deliberately,
outrageously, and successfully hoodwinked-the Supreme Court of Florida
answers, in effect, "well, at least you weren't beaten with a Louisville
slugger.' 53 Entirely true-and entirely beside the point.
But what is more fundamentally troubling is the Wyche H majority's
failure to consider the substantial body of case law addressing this
question--case law from a host of jurisdictions, state and federal, that speaks
with one voice and sets forth one rule: "[A]ccess gained by a government
agent, known to be such by the person with whom the agent is dealing,
violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment's bar against unreasonable searches and
seizures if such entry was acquired by affirmative or deliberate
misrepresentation of the nature of the government's investigation."'54 As
noted previously, all citizens have a "duty to cooperate with the police."' 55 It
therefore must follow that if a police officer comes to me bearing the signs
and symbols of his office, I can and must rely upon the truth of his
representations to me; and if those representations prove to be willfully false,
the consent he elicits from me is a legal nullity.'56 The Wyche II court does
not consider this rule and reject it; it fails to consider it at all.'57
Even more disappointing is some of the language appearing in Justice
Bell's opinion: "My hope is that law enforcement will resist the temptation
to interpret this decision as an endorsement of intentional deception as
acceptable, routine police practice.' ' 158 But it requires no interpretation to
read the majority opinion "as an endorsement of intentional deception as
acceptable, routine police practice;" the majority opinion is "an endorsement
of intentional deception as acceptable, routine police practice." '59 And surely
Justice Bell is aware of how such things filter down to the level of the officer
on the street: The lengthy rescript authored by the jurist is read and reduced
to ever-more distilled versions by a succession of prosecutorial and law
enforcement authorities. By the time it reaches the station-house, it takes the
form, "Hey, the Supreme Court of Florida says it is okay to lie to the bad
guys to get them to consent!" If that was a result Justice Bell hoped to avoid,
his duty was to dissent, not to beat his breast while concurring.
152. Id. at 29 n.6 (citing Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1984)).
153. See, e.g., id. at 28.
154. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
155. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
156. See SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981).
157. See Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 28.
158. Id. at 32 (Bell, J., concurring).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
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Conceding as a prefatory matter that Florida "case law has done little to
provide concrete examples of when ... trickery or intentional deception will
render a consent involuntary, ' 60 Justice Anstead offered a dissent joined by
Justice Pariente centered around the theme "that the degree and the flagrant
nature of the deception intentionally used by the police to secure Wyche's
consent" rendered that consent invalid.161 Justice Anstead was prepared to
hold as a matter of law "that consent is not voluntary where the government
obtains it by intentionally and falsely informing a person in custody that the
person is suspected of a completely fabricated crime."'62
Justice Lewis, in an even more protracted dissent-also joined by
Justice Pariente-took the opposite approach: For him, the question was not
one of law but of fact, and required an examination of the totality of
160. Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 38 (Anstead, J., dissenting). Justice Anstead's dissent relied
upon Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006). See id. at 39-40. It also
referenced United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989) and United States v.
Andrews, 746 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1984). See id. at 37 n. 11. Carter concerns itself exclusively,
or nearly so, with the Fifth Amendment law of confession, not the Fourth Amendment law of
consent. See Carter, 884 F.2d at 373-74. The Andrews court, after attempting to avoid the
force of its own precedent in both the United States v. Tweel line of cases and the Graves v.
Beto line of cases, concludes tepidly that although "the district court could have found from
the evidence that [the police] did trick Andrews . . . [and that therefore] this Court might
remand to the district court for such a determination," it would not do so. Andrews, 746 F.2d
at 249 n.3.
161. Wyche H, 987 So. 2d at 38 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 42. In the first post-Wyche I case, State v. Bartling, the Fourth District
appeared to apply elements of both the majority holding in Wyche I and Justice Anstead's
dissent. See State v. Bartling, 989 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). In Bartling,
Deputy Castando, eager to search Bartling's residence for drugs, obtained permission to enter
by claiming falsely "that he had received an anonymous tip that someone was dragging a dead
body in a rug outside of the apartment. When [Bartling was] asked if he would mind if [the
police] looked for a dead body, he permitted them to enter the ... apartment." Id. at 758-59.
Exploiting this pretext, the police searched for and found the drugs for the possession of
which Bartling was subsequently prosecuted. Id. at 759. Affirming the trial court's grant of
Bartling's motion to suppress, the Fourth District purported to cite Wyche II for the
proposition that where, as here, the lie told by the police was such a whopper-"we recognize
. . . [Bartling's] understandable desire to clear his . . . name of the stigma of a rape
accusation,"--suppression remains the appropriate remedy. Id. at 762. By implication, then,
the Fourth District understands Wyche II to mean that when the police tell a reasonable lie-
as, presumably, they did to Earl Wyche-suppression is excessive. See id. Whether other
Florida courts will embrace this distinction is a nice question. The Bartling court based its
decision on a second ground: that of scope of consent. Bartling, 989 So. 2d at 762. Mr.
Bartling's consent to the police entry and search was predicated upon an alleged need to find a
dead body. Id. at 758-59. The "cocaine and drug paraphernalia" which the officers found,
and which subsequently formed the basis of Bartling's prosecution, were in a cigarette pack.
Id. at 759. "[T]he search clearly exceeded the scope of consent when the police searched for
a dead body in a cigarette pack." Id. at 762. This argument seems a good deal more forcible.
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circumstances, including but certainly not limited to the circumstance of the
police having lied to Wyche.'63 Examples of other circumstances considered
relevant by Justice Lewis include: "[T]he [nature] and extent of the police
deception"; "whether the defendant was informed of' any relevant rights;
"whether the defendant was in custody" at the relevant time; "whether the
police possessed probable cause" as to the crime under investigation and the
defendant's role in it; and whether the police made any promises or
representations to the defendant to induce his consent."M Applying this
totality of circumstances test, Justice Lewis would have found Wyche's
consent involuntary. 1
65
Although both Justice Anstead's involuntary-as-a-matter-of-law
dissent 166 and Justice Lewis's involuntary-in-the-circumstances dissent
167
have much to commend them, they suffer from the fundamental infirmity
that also characterizes the majority opinion: They overlook the unifying
principle behind the considerable body of case law prohibiting the conduct
visited upon Wyche. When the police ask us-you, me, Earl Wyche-for
help or information, we have a public duty to help them if we can do so
without infracting our own rights. But the police-when we know it is the
police with whom we are dealing-have a correlative duty to be truthful in
framing their requests for help or information. Breach of their duty of
truthfulness deracinates our duty of cooperation. Nothing could be more
destructive of the role of the constabulary in a free society than a general
perception that the police exploit the appurtenances of their office to deceive
and trap, and that therefore only a fool would provide help or truthful
information to an officer who sought those things of him.
Thus, if Wyche is considered solely in light of existing precedent and
traditional principles governing the jurisprudence of consent-precedent and
163. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 64-65 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Although Justice Lewis cited
to cases involving the law of confession, he clearly appreciated the distinction drawn in
Frazier v. Cupp between that law and the law governing consent. Id. at 49-50 (citing Frazier
v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)). Dilating on Frazier, which upheld the admissibility of a
confession obtained after the defendant had been falsely told by the police that his
codefendant had already confessed, Justice Lewis offered this highly engaging and instructive
explanation:
This form of police deception is fair because it is similar to merely bluffing in a
poker game: It does not compel suspects to incriminate themselves any more than a
large bet in a poker game compels an opponent to believe that the betting player has
a stronger hand and that he or she should correspondingly fold.
Id. at 56.
164. Wyche 1I, 987 So. 2d at 59 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 43 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 44,46 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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principles as to which there is national consensus-it fails.'68 But a
diacritical feature of the Wyche case-the fact that the object of the police
search and seizure was a tissue sample from which a DNA profile was to be
derived-gives rise to a separate, albeit equally irrefragable, refutation of the
reasoning and result in Wyche.' 69
III. How DNA BEARS UPON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT TO A SEARCH OR
SEIZURE
T[he] time was 9:05 on September 10, 1984. Professor Sir Alec
Jeffreys remembers the moment distinctly. The X-ray films of his
tests had just emerged from the machine. "At first the images
looked [like] a complicated mess," he recalls. "Then the penny
dropped. We had found a method of DNA-based biological
identification." 17
0
"The 'double helix' discovery" of the nature and structure of DNA was
made by Watson and Crick at Cambridge in 1953.'' 1.. Sir Alec Jeffrey's
DNA identification technique was first employed in a British deportation
proceeding in 1985, and shortly thereafter in a paternity dispute. 172 It leapt
onto the stage of history in what the British press rejoiced to refer to as, "the
infamous Enderby murder case."'
73
Since Sir Alec's epiphany in 1984, forensic DNA science has advanced
at a forced-march pace. By 1994, the obvious relevance of DNA science to
criminal investigation and prosecution prompted Congress to pass the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, authorizing the FBI to
168. Id. at 44,46 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
169. Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 44 (Lewis, J., dissenting).






The case had begun with the murder and rape of Lynda Mann, 15, in 1983 in the
Leicestershire village [of Enderby]. Dawn Ashworth, 15, died in a copycat killing
three years later. Police arrested a man who confessed to the second murder but
denied the first. The DNA showed that the same man had murdered both girls but he
was not the prime suspect. Some 5,000 local men gave blood samples. One, Colin
Pitchfork, eventually confessed; he had persuaded a friend to give blood on his
behalf. His DNA was a match.
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establish a national index of DNA samples from convicted offenders.174 The
FBI exercised this authority by linking databanks via the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), a software infrastructure.' All fifty state
legislatures "enacted statutes requiring convicted offenders to provide DNA
samples for ... entry into the CODIS system."'76  CODIS enables crime
laboratories around the country "to exchange and compare DNA profiles
electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime scenes for which
there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the
system."'
177
In December of 1998, "the FBI requested that Congress enact [more
explicit] statutory authority" to allow the FBI to take DNA samples from
federal offenders for inclusion in CODIS. 178  On December 19, 2000,
Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act. 179 Pursuant to
this statute, individuals "convicted of a qualifying Federal offense" must
provide "a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample" for analysis. 8 °  After a
174. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
175. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: NATIONAL
DNA INDEX SYSTEM, (Feb. 24, 2004), http://foia.fbi.gov/ndispia.htm [hereinafter NATIONAL
DNA INDEX SYSTEM]. It is a mistake, albeit a common one, to conceive of CODIS as a
databank, a database, a computer or group of computers. See President's DNA Initiative,
What is CODIS?, http://www.dna.gov/uses/solving-crimes/coldcaseslhowdatabasesaidlcodis/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2008). It is no such thing. See id. Such databanks and databases do
exist. See NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM, supra. The databank of DNA profiles maintained
by the FBI is NDIS, the national DNA index system. Id. Around the country various local
crime labs-in Florida, the Miami-Dade Crime Lab, for example, or the Palm Beach County
Crime Lab-maintain their own databanks; these are referred to as LDIS's, local DNA index
systems. NGA.ORG, IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY BY EXPANDING THE USE OF FORENSIC DNA,
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0702FORENSICDNA.PDF. Each such LDIS in Florida
supports and feeds into the SDIS in Tallahassee, the state DNA index system maintained by
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. See id. CODIS "is the automated DNA
information processing and telecommunications system that supports," links, and unifies the
various LDIS/SDIS/NDIS databases. President's DNA Initiative, Advancing Justice Through
DNA Technology, Levels of the Database, http://www.dna.gov/uses/database/levels (last
visited Oct. 26, 2008).




179. See generally DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,
114 Stat. 2726 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2000)).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2000).
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sample is collected and analyzed, the resulting DNA profile is input into
CODIS, and thereafter is available to CODIS licensees.'
18
Similarly, Florida Statute section 943.325 provides for, as to every
person convicted of a felony, 82 compulsory drawing of blood, DNA analysis,
and DNA data banking. 83 Pursuant to the statute, the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE), Florida's statewide police agency,
and the statewide criminal laboratory analysis system shall
establish, implement, and maintain a statewide automated personal
identification system capable of, but not limited to, classifying,
matching, and storing analyses of DNA.... The system shall be
available to all criminal justice agencies. 184
DNA profiles are to be expunged from the CODIS system by the FBI
director only if the director receives a final court order establishing that the
conviction giving rise to the DNA profile has been overturned.'85 As a
condition of CODIS licensure, states are also directed to expunge DNA
records of an individual if his conviction is overturned. 186 There is, however,
so far as appears in the statute, no enforcement mechanism as to this
requirement. 87  Neither the FBI nor any other federal entity audits the
SDIS's to confirm that states are meeting their obligation to expunge records
as to defendants who were acquitted or whose convictions were overturned
181. See id. § 14135a(b). The list of qualifying federal offenses was expanded to include
any felony by the Justice for All Act of 2004. Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
405, § 203(b)(d)(l), 118 Stat. 2260, 2269-70.
182. See generally FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2007). The statute also extends to juvenile
offenders, who under Florida law are found "delinquent" rather than "guilty." Id. §
943.325(10)(d). Florida Statutes section 947.1405(7)(a)10 and 948.03(l)(n) apply the same
requirements-redundantly, at least in part-to inmates admitted to controlled release
programs, probation, and community control. FLA. STAT. §§ 947.1405(7)(a)9, 948.03(l)(n)
(2007).
183. FLA. STAT. § 943.325. The chief judges of Florida's Fifteenth Judicial Circuit (the
felony trial court having jurisdiction over Palm Beach County) and Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit (the felony trial court having jurisdiction over Broward County, the county located
between Palm Beach and Miami-Dade) have entered administrative orders tracking the
language of the statute. In re: Required DNA Testing for Non-Sexual Offenders, Fla. Admin.
Order No. III-OO-J-1 (Aug. 9, 2000); In re: Required DNA Testing for Non-Sexual
Offenders, Fla. Admin. Order No. 4.045-8/99 (Sept. 2, 1999); see In re: Required DNA
Testing for Certain Sexual Offenders & Sexual Predators, Fla. Admin. Order No. 4.044-8/99
(Sept. 1, 1999).
184. FLA. STAT. § 943.325(8).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1) (2000).
186. Id. § 14132(d)(2).
187. See id. § 14132.
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on appeal. The burden to seek expunction is on the defendant, but no
provision of Florida law obliges any judge or any other player in the criminal
justice system to inform a defendant whose case was dismissed or conviction
overturned that he may seek, and should obtain, expunction of his DNA
profile from the CODIS system. 188 Thus, the clear requirement of the federal
statute notwithstanding, it is unlikely that any Floridian has ever benefitted
from a record expunction. 8 9
Such protection against information abuse as exists comes in two
forms. 9° First, access to CODIS data is limited for use by criminal justice
agencies for use in judicial proceedings; 91 and for use in research and
development of identification methods and quality control purposes. 9 z
Disclosure of data for any other purpose is a misdemeanor. 93 Second,
forensic analysis is done by decoding sequences of what is referred to as
"junk DNA,"'194 DNA believed not to be associated with physical or medical
characteristics (other, of course, than the characteristics sufficient to identify
the donor of the DNA). 9 5
This is gossamer armor. The universe of people employed by or
affiliated with "criminal justice agencies" of one kind or another who can
lawfully root around in CODIS and its databases is large and growing; so is
188. See generally id.
189. A Floridian convicted of a felony does not merely forfeit forever whatever
expectation of privacy he once had in his DNA profile; he actually pays for the privilege. See
FLA. STAT. § 943.325(12). Section 943.325(12) provides that unless he "has been declared
indigent by the court, the convicted person shall pay the actual costs of collecting the blood
specimens" from which his DNA profile will be derived. Id. By operation of Florida
Constitution Art. I § 19, however, such costs cannot be collected until the conviction upon
which they are based becomes final, i.e., until it is affirmed on appeal. FLA. CONST. art. I §
19. Thus, the State of Florida can force a needle into a convicted felon's arm, withdraw his
life's-blood, analyze that blood, post the fruits of that analysis to data banks from which they
will never be removed, and where they can be examined who-knows-when by who-knows-
whom, all before the first step has been taken in an appellate process designed to determine
whether the conviction in question was lawful. But the state of Florida cannot demand
payment of the few dollars in costs associated with the blood-drawing process until the court
of appeal has satisfied itself that the conviction in question was lawful. See id.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b) (2000).
191. Id. § 14133(b)(1)(A)-(B).
192. Id. § 14133(b)(2). A defendant may also obtain access to his data and the samples
from which the data were derived for criminal defense purposes. Id. § 14133(b)(1)(C).
193. Id. § 14135e(c).
194. THOMAS CURRAN, SCI. & TECH. Div., PARLIAMENT RESEARCH BRANCH, LIBRARY OF
PARLIAMENT, FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS: TECHNOLOGY AND APPLICATION 6 (1997),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp443-e.pdf.
195. See generally NSW HSC Online, Chemistry,
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the population of those who may have occasion to employ CODIS-type data
for research and development. 196 The defendant who compliantly provides a
piece of himself for DNA analysis-Wyche, for example- 97 likely does not
know that the fruits of that analysis will remain in databases until the end of
time.' 98
A year from now, or two years, or twenty, unknown and
unknowable pairs of hands and eyes, in unknown and unknowable
locations, may access that data for good or bad reasons. The
Floridian [-Wyche, for example- whose DNA records they are]
will never learn that [those] records have been examined, or when,
or where, or by whom, or for what reason .... And perhaps next
year, or the year after that, as DNA science leaps forward, the data
stored in CODIS will enable an informed examiner of that data to
know if [a given donor, Wyche, for example,] has a genetic
disposition toward [jaywalking], Aretifism, or rooting for the
Chicago Cubs. "No one [yet] knows what sort of information-
such as propensity to disease or psychological characteristics-
will eventually be able to be extracted from DNA."'
199
Nor is there great comfort to be taken from the statutory promise that
such valuable and sensitive data will be seen only by those authorized to see
it.2°° CODIS is relatively neoteric; the internal controls intended to guard it,
even more so. But as the data it contains burgeon, and the number of
authorized users burgeons, the chances for and likelihood of a loss of control
196. See Milton Hirsch, A Nation of Suspects, CHAMPION MAG., Apr. 2007, at 52.
197. Section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes concerns itself with convicted Floridians.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(l)(a), (b). But Rule 3.220(c)(1)(G) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure may result in the permanent recordation of the DNA profile of an arrested
Floridian, even if he is later exonerated. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(c)(1)(G) (granting Florida
courts discretion to require from a defendant "samples of defendant's blood, hair, and other
materials of defendant's body.. . after the filing of the charging document"). And because
Wyche "consented" to the analysis of his DNA, his DNA profile will remain in the CODIS
system in perpetuity, whether or not he had been convicted, whether or not his conviction had
been affirmed on appeal. See Hirsch, supra note 197.
198. Hirsch, supra note 197, at 52.
199. Hirsch, supra note 197, at 52-53 (quoting Stewart Tendler, DNA Pioneer Accuses the
Police of Being Overzealous, THE TiMEs (London), Nov. 2, 2006, at 7). Under the present
state of the law, such a convicted person has no protected Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy in the data derived from analysis of his biological tissue. See Hirsch, supra note 197,
at 54; see also United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 281 (D. Mass 2007) (stating "a
're-search' of the DNA database once constructed may not implicate the Fourth Amendment")
(citing Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489,498 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
200. See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(7).
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of data, whether intentional or negligent, must be assumed to burgeon as
well.20'
It is against the foregoing backdrop, and not in a more traditional
context, that Wyche's putative consent to the seizure of his genetic material
and its subsequent analysis must be considered. In the more traditional
context, cases involving consent issues were often, as Abraham Lincoln said
of his politics, "short and sweet, like the old woman's dance."2 2 if the police
pull the next Earl Wyche over and ask to search his car, that search will take
a matter of minutes. The search will reveal something of interest to the
police or it won't. If it does, Wyche will be arrested or investigated further.
If it doesn't, Wyche will be sent along his way. When the search is over, it's
over. There will be no sequelae, no residual consequences.2 °3
If Wyche's cell tissue is seized by the police, the seizure is a matter of
minutes. But there the similarity ends. The cell tissue will, as discussed
supra, be sent to the local crime lab where it will be DNA-profiled. °" The
cell tissue itself will be preserved by the crime lab in perpetuity.0 5 The DNA
profile will be uploaded to CODIS. °6 As of November 2005, all fifty
American states and 39 sites in 24 countries-"Belgium, Botswana, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia,
Finland, France, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland"-had
received the CODIS software from the FBI and thus had access to the
system.2 0 Wyche's DNA profile will remain in the system unless and until it
is removed, which is to say that in all likelihood it will remain in
perpetuity.2 8 If the local crime lab which holds Wyche's tissue sample
wants to re-test it next year, or the year after that, employing some new test
designed to elicit new information, Wyche is entitled to neither notice nor
hearing and will receive neither.2' If any crime lab, anywhere, wants to
201. See generally Hirsch, supra note 197. In England, "[tiwo computer disks bearing
addresses, bank account numbers and other details of about 25 million people-almost half
the British population-were popped into internal government mail and never arrived." Jill
Lawless, Data on 25M People Lost in the Mail, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 22, 2007, at A04.
202. SAMUEL G. SMITH, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 11 (1902).
203. See Hirsch, supra note 197, at 53.
204. See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(5).
205. Hirsch, supra note 197, at 54.
206. See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(6).
207. AUDIT Div., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA
INDEX SYSTEM OPERATIONAL AND LABORATORY VULNERABILITIES, AUDIT REPORT 06-32, at 10
n.9 (May 2006), available at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBIlaO632/final.pdf.
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examine or analyze Wyche's DNA profile next year, or the year after that,
employing some new test designed to elicit new information, Wyche is
entitled to neither notice nor hearing and will receive neither.21 °
Traditionally, "[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's
consent [to a search or seizure] under the Fourth Amendment is that of
'objective' reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" 2t ' In
Florida v. Jimeno,21 2 the United States Supreme Court distinguished the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Wells.
213
There the Supreme Court of Florida held that consent to search the
trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked
briefcase found inside the trunk. It is very likely unreasonable to
think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has
agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk,
but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.21 4
Whether it is reasonable to understand a consent to search a trunk to
include a paper bag in that trunk, but not to include a locked briefcase in that
trunk, is something that can be resolved by reference to common experience
and common expectations of privacy.215 With respect to DNA profiling and
the CODIS system, there is little or no common experience and less common
understanding. Earl Wyche was not told that the DNA sample he was asked
to give would result in information that would be available to and examined
by the police department that ultimately arrested him, for the crime for which
he was ultimately arrested; nor that it would remain available for comparison
to crime-scene evidence past, present, and future by police departments all
over the country and the world.216 He was told that he was giving a DNA
sample that could be used to exonerate him as to a burglary that neither he
nor anyone else actually committed.217 That is all he was told.218 In the
words of the Wyche II majority:
210. See id.
211. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 183-89 (1990)).
212. Id. at 248.
213. 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989), affdon other grounds, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
214. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52.
215. See, eg., id. at 251-52.
216. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 2008).
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Wyche was asked to consent and did consent to the saliva swabs
for use in a burglary investigation. [The lead investigator]
truthfully represented that the police desired a sample of Wyche's
DNA for purposes of an ongoing investigation. Wyche was
informed that the requested evidence could match or exclude him
in respect to a crime and that he was a suspect in a police
investigation. 2
19
Wyche was told he was consenting to the testing of his DNA in a
burglary investigation, a particular burglary investigation.20 He was told
that there was an ongoing investigation, a particular investigation of a
particular burglary. 22' He was told that DNA testing would match or exclude
him as to a crime, the particular crime as to which there was a police
investigation already in train. 222 He was never told-he was deliberately
prevented from knowing-that information derivative from his DNA would
be examined in connection with other pending crimes as to which the police
were presently interested, and other future crimes any time the police became
interested.23  At the end of the paragraph captioned above the Supreme
Court of Florida concluded that "Wyche was not deluded as to the import of
his consent. '2 24 It would be impossible for him to have been more deluded.
Wyche was led, deliberately, to believe that he was consenting to the one-
time examination of his DNA for the purposes of determining his
involvement or non-involvement in one crime.225 His consent extended to
that one examination for that one purpose, not to any other examination for
any other purpose.22 6 Yet he was convicted based upon the comparison of
his DNA in another case, a comparison not within the scope of his consent. 27
The Wyche II court and parties were not unaware of section 943.325 of
the Florida Statutes.28 On October 19, 2006, the court entered an order
"directing the parties to serve supplemental briefs specifically addressing the
applicability and impact of section 943.325, Florida Statutes. '2 9 Wyche
took the position that as section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes read at the
219. Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 30 (Fla. 2008) (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 27.
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time of his prior convictions he had not been obliged to provide tissue
samples, and his orders of judgment and sentence had not required him to do
so. 2 30 That being the case, the police had no statutory authority to compel his
genetic material, and could obtain such material only pursuant to consent-
or, of course, a warrant; which concededly was not employed here. 3
Because, in Wyche's view, his consent was constitutionally defective, the
resulting DNA profile was "fruit of the poisonous tree;" and section 943.325
of the Florida Statutes was inapplicable and irrelevant.232 The prosecution
took the position that the version of section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes
in effect at the time when Wyche's tissue samples were taken provided that
such samples could be taken from a probationer presently in custody, and
that therefore the police were empowered to obtain Wyche's genetic material
for DNA profiling with or without his consent. 33
In the event, none of the opinions in Wyche II made reference to section
943.325 of the Florida Statutes. The majority opinion, as well as the two
dissenting opinions, confined themselves to the certified conflict between the
First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on the constitutionality of consent
obtained by gross deceit under color of law. 34 Whatever the proper
interpretation of former iterations of section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes,
Earl Wyche's DNA profile is now in the CODIS system to stay, available for
inspection by all CODIS licensees at all times, for all reasons, or even for no
reason. 35 Whatever Earl Wyche consented to, he never consented to that.236
IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever else can be said of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Wyche II, this much can be said with certainty: Justice Bell's professed fears
230. Id. at 16-17.
231. See id. at 18.
232. Id. at 4.
233. See Supplemental Answer Brief of Respondent at 7, Wyche v. State, 987 So. 2d 23
(Fla. 2008) (No. SC04-1509).
Neither of Wyche's prior criminal judgments required him to provide blood or
other specimens. When he committed the 1995 burglary, he was not required to do
so under the 1995 version of § 943.325. However, the requirement that he do so, in
the 2001 version of § 943.325, was in place when [the police] requested consent to
the swabs.
Id. (citation omitted).
234. See generally Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008). As noted, Justice Bell's
concurring opinion, for himself and Chief Justice Quince did not discuss the merits of the case
but simply posed concerns about how the majority opinion would be interpreted and applied.
Id. at 32 (Bell, J., concurring).
235. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 197.
236. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 25.
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will surely be realized. The Reader's Digest version of the Wyche II
holding-that police are free to tell any lie, however outrageous, however
false, to obtain a valid waiver of a homeowner's or suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights-will race through the Florida law enforcement
community like wildfire. This is no criticism of the police. On the contrary;
the police are permitted, indeed they are obliged, to avail themselves of all
investigative techniques expressly determined by the courts to be lawful.
Police officers would be recreant in their duty if they failed to employ the
extraordinary weapon that Wyche H has made available to them. That Wyche
II is at odds with all American jurisprudence in all American jurisdictions to
consider the question is of no concern to the officer on the street.
The holding in Wyche II is no doubt of profound concern to judges on
Florida's trial and intermediate appellate benches. But with respect to the
issue actually addressed and resolved by Wyche II, little remains to be said or
done. Absent the use or threat of brute force, consents obtained as a result of
police deception will be valid consents, and evidence obtained as a result of
such consents will be admissible evidence." 7
Perhaps more consequential, however, is the issue that the Wyche II
majority opinion did not address: That of scope of consent.238 Trial and
appellate judges before whom that issue comes must look beyond Wyche II.
Such judges should begin by acknowledging that consent to the seizure
of biological material for purposes of DNA profiling is a qualitatively
different thing from consent to the search of a car or a house. The
homeowner who is asked by the police, "May we search your house?" can be
expected to understand the consequences of his assent: The police will
search, and if they find evidence or contraband it will be seized, and if
evidence or contraband is seized the householder will likely be going to jail.
The suspect who is asked by the police, "May we have a cheek swab or a
blood sample?" cannot be expected to understand the consequences of his
assent: His DNA will be profiled, and the resulting profile will be posted to
interlinked databases around the country and around the world where it may
be analyzed without notice to him in connection with any and every crime
that has been, or may some day be, committed.2 39 The householder almost
certainly has an accurate understanding of the scope of his consent. The
donor of a tissue sample almost certainly has none. Florida courts must
acknowledge that distinction, and its consequences.
237. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973).
238. See generally Wyche I, 987 So. 2d at 23 (emphasis added).
239. See H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1, at 8 (2000).
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DNA science, to the extent that it makes the criminal justice system a
less blunt instrument for separating the speckled flock from the clean, is a
boon and a blessing. As DNA science becomes more refined, its power to
aid the criminal justice process will become more profound. But the
increased sophistication and complexity of the science will increase the gap
by which the ordinary arrestee-the next Earl Wyche-will fall short of
understanding what, exactly, he is consenting to when he consents to the
seizure of his flesh. That shortfall cannot be ignored. The law must place
the burden squarely upon the prosecution and its law enforcement
functionaries to make sure that each of us understands the material
consequences of his consent. Failure to do so would be a betrayal of a core
purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its traditional protection of individual
choice as to matters implicating privacy and personal security.
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